Polish Famot machines are still being transported to Russia through Turkey, avoiding sanctions and aiding the military sector

Polish Famot machines are still being transported to Russia through Turkey, avoiding sanctions and aiding the military sector

“But please, in no contract, in no letter… You can mention it on WhatsApp, but in no contract and in no letter should you mention the military or anything like that, okay?” insisted Bilal, a Turkish citizen who, since the start of the full-scale conflict, has established a system for supplying European machine tools to Russia.

I introduced myself as the manager of a Russian company that works closely with the Russian military-industrial complex and wants to receive equipment on a regular basis for the manufacturing of weapons used in the conflict Ukraine. The subject of the conversation immediately interested my interlocutor. I was calling from an office in central Kyiv, which had been without electricity, water, and heating for several days at the time. It was early February 2026, and -20 degrees Celsius outside. Russia had been destroying Ukraine’s energy infrastructure almost every winter day with ballistic missiles, drones, and strategic aviation.

This story began in late 2025. StateWatch journalists investigated customs data on the supply of sanctioned equipment from the European Union to Russia. This equipment is used in the manufacturing of missiles, Shaheds and other weapons, which the still uses daily both on the front lines and against the civilian population in Ukraine. Among the tens of thousands of daily transactions, the Polish factory FAMOT Pleszew attracted attention. The company has an impeccable reputation in the EU and has been manufacturing high-precision metalworking machines for decades. These machines are capable of working with complex geometric parts, which are critical in the production of components for missile systems and drones. 

These are machines with HS codes 8458.11 and 8457.10 – horizontal lathes and multifunctional machining centres with numerical control. In the international classification, they are classified as High Priority Items – high-risk products that can be used in military production.

According to customs data, during the period of full-scale Russian conflict into Ukraine, as of 30 November 2024, equipment manufactured by the Polish plant FAMOT/DMG MORI worth at least $1.2 million was delivered to Russia. Our colleagues from the Polish media Frontstory, Anastasiia Morozova and Maciej Mozhanski, joined this investigation. Together we unravelled schemes for circumventing sanctions through third countries.

Pleszew. The city of machine tools

A small town of 16,000 people in Poland, focused mainly on industry. Among others, Famot Pleszew, a manufacturer of CNC machine tools, operates here. The factory began its activity back in 1877. In 1999, it was privatised. The new owner was DMG MORI, a German-Japanese corporation based in Tokyo. In April 2024, Famot was officially renamed DMG MORI Poland. However, in everyday life, as well as in customs documents, the company is still referred to by its old name. Today, this company is the largest manufacturer of machine tools in Poland and Central Europe. The plant in Pleszew is developing dynamically, supplying lathes, vertical milling machines, universal milling machines, as well as innovative automation systems. It currently employs about 600 people and is a strategic supplier of components for other DMG MORI group plants.

Earlier, StateWatch analyst Maksym Steblivskyy already described how, a few years before the full-scale conflict, from 2017 to 2021, Russia started buying up machine tools in the European Union. The investigation analysed hundreds of thousands of Russian import transactions. About half of these deliveries were made by Germany. Similarly, about half of the identified machine tools already in Russia were also German-made.

According to the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (GUR), most of the German equipment – 148 machine tools – was manufactured by DMG Mori Seiki. At least 36 such machines are located at the PJSC ODK-Saturn enterprise alone, which is part of the Rostec state corporation and manufactures engines for cruise missiles and military aircraft. The importer was mainly the Moscow-registered company DMG Mori Rus LLC. According to the database, deliveries continued even after the full-scale conflict. In other words, the company had its own representative office in Russia. In the summer of 2022, the Russian branch supplied machine tool components to the aforementioned ODK-Saturn, as a result of which Ukraine added DMG Mori to the list of international sponsors of the conflict. 

At that time, the corporation stated that it had completely withdrawn from the Russian market and was not involved in the supplies. But this is not entirely true. Together with colleagues from Frontstory, StateWatch journalists analysed the supplies of components manufactured by the Polish plant Famot, now DMG Mori, and found they are worth over $1.2 million.

St. Petersburg. Cigar company – military contracts

On 19 July 2024, vertical machining centres for metalworking with a total value of over $100,000 were imported into Russia. The customs documents contain the standard wording: ‘not for military use’. The country of origin was Poland, and the manufacturer was FAMOT PLESZEW SP. Z O.O. The product category was marked with HS code 8457.10, i.e. machine tools that the EU classifies as High Priority Items – critically important equipment that can be used in the production of weapons.

The recipient of the equipment is the Russian company Saturn EK LLC, an inconspicuous firm from St. Petersburg. It has been on the US sanctions list since 2023. The founder and director of the company is Anna Ivanova. She is also the owner and director of EDLAUD LLC, which sells food products at retail, and the director of Havana Cigar Club LLC, which specialises in the sale of tobacco products. Judging by her social media, she lives the good life, travels abroad to conduct wakeboarding training courses, and is most likely just a front person.

Screenshots from Anna Ivanova’s social media

Until 2016, Yuri Skrotsky was listed as the founder of Saturn EK LLC in the Russian register of legal entities. He is now the owner of LLC GC “Snabzhenie”, which he owns together with Vladimir Gavrilov and Dmitry Arkhipov, who in turn are also the owners of the aforementioned Havana Cigar Club LLC, where Anna Ivanova works as a director. Therefore, all these companies are interconnected.

Links between the figures involved in the investigation. Visualised using the YC World tool from the YouControl analytical system

According to the available data (after the start of the full-scale conflict, Russian state procurement became non-public), LLC GC “Snabzhenie” systematically executed state contracts worth hundreds of millions of roubles. The largest customers were: 

• JSC Concern Morinsys-Agat (INN 7720544208) – a leading Russian shipbuilding company specialising in the development, production and maintenance of combat information and control systems, as well as integrated systems for the automated control of naval formations,  and fire control systems for cruise and ballistic missiles.
• JSC Izumrud (TIN 2539028264) – a developer of radar equipment.
• JSC NPK SPP (TIN 7722698108) is one of Russia’s leading military-industrial companies, producing aviation systems for Russian military aircraft, including the SU-27 and the KA-52 attack helicopter.
• JSC NPP (TIN 5402534361) is a Russian manufacturer of small arms and surveillance optics, part of the Rostec State Corporation.
• JSC NII Gidrosvyaz Shtil (INN 3443055050) is the only company in Russia that specialises in developing hydroacoustic communication devices and hydroacoustic emergency rescue systems for the Russian Navy.

All these companies are currently on the sanctions lists of various countries due to their participation in Russia’s full-scale conflict against Ukraine.

According to web archives, prior to the full-scale conflict, the company positioned itself on its official website as a highly qualified supplier of electronic components and modules from leading foreign manufacturers such as Altera, Xilinx, Analogue Devices, Texas Instruments, and Atmel, whose products are still used in Russian missiles and drones today. In 2022, the website was ‘for some reason’ deleted. Also, according to the Russian legal register Fedresurs, in July 2022, LLC GK “Snabzhenie” leased equipment manufactured by DMG Mori.

Screenshot from the Russian legal register Fedresurs

After the start of the full-scale conflict, LLC GC “Snabzhenie” supplied equipment to the military enterprise Chelyabinsk radio plant “Polet”. This is stated in the case of the Russian court. The court found that LLC GK “Snabzhenie” supplied goods to the  “Polet” radio plant for a total amount of more than $868,000. This decision also provides specific dates of deliveries under the state defence contract.

Screenshot from the decision of the Arbitration Court of the Chelyabinsk Region

Therefore, it is clear that individuals associated with Saturn EK LLC are also associated with Russian defence contracts.

Another fact. After the start of the full-scale conflict, Saturn EK’s financial indicators increased significantly.

Screenshot from the Russian register of legal entities

High-precision equipment manufactured by the Polish plant Famot for Saturn EK was supplied by the Turkish company OTL Uluslararasi Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi, an entity that has been under sanctions by the EU, Ukraine, and Switzerland since 2025. According to the sanctions authorities, it is involved in re-export schemes used to conceal the final Russian recipients. During the full-scale conflict, this company imported goods worth more than $2.5 million into the Russian Federation.

Domodedovo. Wood corks with defence ambitions

According to available customs data, which only covers the period up to and including March 2025, the last shipment of equipment manufactured by the Polish plant Famot took place on 30 November 2024. The amount was almost $82,000. This was a horizontal numerically controlled lathe and milling machine manufactured in 2017, also declared as ‘for non-military purposes’. The recipient is the Russian company Kortisa LLC, registered only in July 2023 near Moscow in Domodedovo. According to Russian legal entity registers, it specialises in the manufacture of plywood, wood-based panels and boards. In practice, however, the company is actually engaged in the manufacture of wood corks. This is stated on its website.

Screenshot from the Kortisa company website

And here’s the catch. Among the equipment in the photo from the website, journalists did not see any metalworking machines. But theoretically, a horizontal turning and milling machine can be used to process wood. In practice, using equipment designed for steel and titanium, with cooling systems, rigid construction and industrial loads, to manufacture ordinary wooden corks is technologically and economically absurd. Such machines are designed for the production of shafts, bushings, housing parts and complex assemblies with micron precision, i.e. for heavy engineering, not for woodworking. 

What is more, officially having only two employees, in 2024, Kortisa LLC received income of almost 100 million roubles, or about one million dollars.

Screenshot from the Russian register of legal entities

Istanbul. Don’t mention the military, and everything will be fine

It is not known whether this particular machine was supplied to a company that manufactures weapons or cooperates with the Russian military‑industrial complex. But we found a Turkish intermediary, Pyramid Muhendislik Ticaret Limited Sirketi, which supplied Polish Famot equipment directly to the Russian company Kortisa LLC. The company was registered in Istanbul in 2011. At least, that is what is stated on the website. But for some reason, according to the Turkish register, Bilal Ipek founded this company only in May 2023.

The company’s website lists Bilal’s contact details in one of the messengers. So, having come up with a cover story, posing as the manager of a Russian company that works closely with the Russian military-industrial complex, I dialled the number without hesitation. 

The phone conversation with Bilal Ipek began routinely, but very quickly turned to the sensitive topic of sanctions and military contracts. After a brief introduction, I explained the purpose of my call: 

“Our company supplies equipment to the military in Russia, and now we are trying to find suppliers of European equipment due to the ‘well-known’ situation, if you understand what I mean. We are trying to find specific equipment, a CNC machine for our work, model CLX-350, manufactured by Famot.” 

In response, Bilal immediately asked for details: “Do you need a new or a used one?” Hearing that both options were possible, he almost immediately got to the point: “What about payment? Are you aware of the sanctions?” I assured him that “we will try to find a solution; we have partners in other countries who can transfer the funds.” The Turkish manager then outlined his own experience of circumventing restrictions: 

“Sometimes I work with other Russian companies. I work with one bank. Sometimes they allow us to deposit money in roubles. I also sold CNC machines to Russia last year. I bought them in Europe and arranged for export transfer. In the end, we sold them. There are agents, do you understand?” 

He was referring to the CLX 350 model, which is manufactured by the Polish factory Famot. Bilal confirmed that he knew the brand, but asked for clarification on the configuration and even offered an alternative: “Perhaps I can offer you another option.” At the same time, he stated a key condition for cooperation: 

“But please, in no contract, in no letter, okay, in WhatsApp is fine, but in no contract and in no letter mention the military or anything like that, okay?”

After the call, the conversation continued via messenger.

Bilal sends a list of equipment that is currently in stock and ready for sale. Most of it is signed as DMG Mori

Files with a list of available equipment at the Turkish company, sent by Bilal

I further inquire about the possibility of supplying new equipment. Bilal claims that it will be difficult to pull off with DMG Mori, but… it is possible. Moreover, he confirms that this has been done before.

Screenshot of the conversation with the supplier

Thus, in the conversation, the Turkish supplier directly confirmed his experience supplying European machine tools to Russia since the start of full-scale sanctions, his willingness to seek financial solutions through banks and agents, and, separately, emphasised the need to avoid any mention of the equipment’s military purpose in official documents.

POLISH POSITION

Our colleagues from the Polish publication Frontstory sent inquiries to both the Polish factory and the parent company. In response, DMG Mori stated that they could not rule out the possibility that third parties could have purchased the equipment and exported it illegally. 

“As a machine tool manufacturer, we strongly oppose the unauthorized movement of equipment. It is for this purpose that we have developed RMS technology. RMS stands for ”Relocation Machine Security”: a sensor detects the movement of the machine and automatically shuts it down. It can only be restarted in a new location after being unlocked by a DMG MORI service technician. We developed RMS technology in Japan many years ago, continuously improved it, and gradually introduced it worldwide. Since January 1, 2024, all DMG MORI machines worldwide have been equipped with RMS as standard. We are unable to track or control the location of older machines that are not equipped with RMS,” the response states.

Despite DMG MORI’s official statements about its complete withdrawal from the Russian market as early as 2022, high-precision machine tools from the Polish factory in Pleszew continue to find their way into the Russian Federation through Turkish intermediaries who specialise in circumventing sanctions. Turkish traders openly offer schemes to conceal the military purpose of the equipment in documents, while the end recipients in Russia are front companies linked to state orders for key defence industry enterprises. This indicates a systemic vulnerability in the EU’s sanctions regime for dual-use products.